Research ReportsThe hyperscaler depreciation shock is already locked in at TODAY'S useful-life assumptions — Alphabet alone holds $108,597M of "assets not yet in service" carrying zero depreciation (up from $78,592M in one quarter), and roughly $281bn sits not-yet-depreciating across Alphabet, Meta, Amazon and Oracle — while the useful-life reversion the bears await was already executed by Amazon in 2025 and cost exactly $0.10 per diluted share, about 1.4% of EPS, in a year its EPS rose sharply.
By The Journal · 28 min read · July 14, 2026
Research ReportsThe duration mismatch is real but it is not OpenAI's: the ledger shows OpenAI's compute "obligations" are largely options it is short — only $18.4bn (~1.3% of the $1.4tn headline) is quantified by name in any SEC filing, NVIDIA's $100bn was "never a commitment" and appears nowhere in its 10-K, Broadcom is a term sheet with no dollar figure, one of AMD's six gigawatts is binding, Stargate's $500bn is intent on SoftBank's balance sheet, and management re-anchored the plan from $1.4tn to "roughly $600 billion" and trimmed Stargate sites with no counterparty penalty reported — while OpenAI sits on $73bn of permanent-equity cash with no disclosed balance-sheet debt and is lengthening its revenue duration via Guaranteed Capacity; the fixed, dated, legally enforceable leg sits with the suppliers and their lenders (Oracle's $638bn RPO, 88% of it beyond twelve months, backed by a bankruptcy risk factor about a customer it will not name; Broadcom's own $128,110m of non-cancellable purchase commitments against zero disclosed OpenAI backlog; CoreWeave's $98.8bn RPO with OpenAI named inside its credit-risk factor), which is exactly where the Bank of England and the BIS say the maturity mismatch is being warehoused and mispriced.
By The Journal · 29 min read · July 14, 2026
Research ReportsThe brief has it backwards: at $965B on a $47B run-rate (~20.5x), even a physically impossible 100% gross margin still leaves the equity at 20.5x gross profit — so only growth, not margin, can rescue the price; customer concentration is a stale, anonymously-sourced mid-2025 figure ($1.2B of a ~$4B base) measured against a denominator that has since grown roughly 12x; gross margin is not a known risk but an unknown accounting choice (the SpaceX + AWS contracts alone imply a ~47% company-level gross-margin ceiling if compute is COGS, and a 70% margin is reachable only if training compute sits below the line as R&D); and the exposures the brief never names are the ones the primary documents actually show — more than $225B of fixed, multi-year, partly vendor-financed compute obligations against a sworn lifetime revenue of "exceeding $5 billion," a headline metric built by multiplying a 28-day window by 13 under a formula Anthropic has never published, and one product (Claude Code, ~18% of run-rate) in the one category where the largest named customers can build their own models.
By The Journal · 26 min read · July 14, 2026
Research ReportsThe SpaceX float-scarcity story is wrong — the 19% pop was ordinary underpricing against a 4x book, every supply mechanic the scarcity thesis depends on has already failed in public, and the real price discovery is not the lock-up cascade but the denominator: a ~95x sales multiple built on revenue that exists only because xAI and X were retrospectively combined into every prior period.
By The Journal · 38 min read · July 14, 2026
